Conventional agency theory typically focuses on a unidirectional problem, in which an agent behaves opportunistically against the interests of a principal. Yet, this conceptualization is too limited to fully describe all aspects of principal–agent relationships. This article presents a more comprehensive framework explaining a potential three-directional problem—that is, agents behave opportunistically against the interests of principals, principals behave opportunistically against the interests of agents, and relationships between agents and principals representing confluence of interests affect the interests of third-party stakeholders. The (...) article provides evidence of these problems, describes their unique characteristics, and outlines implications for society. It concludes with a discussion focusing on the implications of the proposed framework for purported governance solutions, the ongoing debate between shareholder and stakeholder views of the firm, and business practices. (shrink)

Recent perspectives on community investments suggest that they are opportunities for firms to create value for shareholders and other stakeholders. However, many corporate managers are still influenced by a widely held belief that such investments erode profits and are therefore unjustifiable from an agency perspective. In this paper, we refine and test theory regarding countervailing forces that influence community-based firm performance. We hypothesize that high levels of available slack will be associated with higher community-based performance, but that this relationship will (...) be moderated by three important governance variables: board independence, investment fund ownership, and CEO ownership. We find support for our hypotheses in longitudinal study of a large sample of U.S. corporations. (shrink)

This article focuses on the ways that sexual risk behaviors are related to race, class, and gender among low-income, culturally diverse women in South Florida. Data concerning sexual risk and gender are presented in terms of race and class variations. Results indicate that, in general, these women have a high degree of knowledge about acquired immune deficiency syndrome, a quite contemporary awareness of women's gendered subordination, and a lack of trust in heterosexual relationships. Attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge, however, are not (...) translated into sexual behaviors with men partners that would reduce their vulnerability to infection with the human immunodeficiency virus. The data indicate that race is a major factor that places women into an underclass position. Consequently, without socioeconomic resources, gendered behaviors have a direct influence on sexual risk. Multivariate analyses indicate that those women who are sex workers are significantly more likely to negotiate safe sex with clients than with main partners. The research not only challenges mainstream thinking about race, class, and gender but also provides overdue information on the vulnerability of women to HIV infection. (shrink)

Harrison, Helen Adelaide's first bishop, Francis Murphy, was baptised in Navan, County Meath, Ireland, on 24 May 1795. His parents were Arthur Murphy and Bridget nee Flood. Baptismal records suggest his siblings included John Joseph, Arthur, Catherine, John Joseph Michael and Christopher. It is unlikely that all of these survived for long because by the time Francis Murphy was Bishop of Adelaide, he was writing to 'my sister' and 'my brother'.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ill HUME ON THE MORALITY OF PRINCES "There is a maxim very current in the world," says Hume (Treatise III, ii, sec. 11) "that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons. " He interprets the maxim to mean that "the morality of princes... has not the same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully (...) be transgress 'd from a more trivial motive." And he gives as an example: "we must necessarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another; than to a private gentleman, who breaks his word of honour" (T 569). This passage, cryptic though it is, makes Hume sound bad. He seems to be a cynic, or a skeptic, or an immoralist, with respect to the morality of nations. Does he think that princes have a special right to act immorally? Even worse is the reason he gives: international relations just don't matter very much, he says. And the chapter in question is not just a self-contained essay more or less tacked on to the Treatise. Hume tries to connect it integrally with his theory of justice. The point of the chapter is not to put forward a view about the morality of international relations (a view Hume himself admits may be found shocking), but to demonstrate the power of the theory of justice by showing how the "maxim current in the world" can be defended upon the theory's principles. The passage has not won approval from recent commentators. One, Marshall Cohen, labels Hume a "moderate skeptic" with regard to international morality and argues vehemently that Hume's position 2 should be condemned as immoral. Cohen, who thinks that there is only one system of morality and that it 112 applies "with equal force to princes and private persons," evidently thinks any system weakening ordinary standards is immoral by definition. He traces Hume's allegedly morally flawed views to what he regards as a deep flaw in Hume's moral theory, namely, his conventionalism. J. L. Mackie and Jonathan Harrison are both considerably more sympathetic to Hume's general position, but nevertheless are critical of the chapter in question. They agree with Hume's observation that international morality is weaker than private. (Harrison points out that people tend to regard breaches of private morality as more serious than breaches of international morality: "A minister may be dismissed for sexual misconduct, although he breaks solemn treaties with other nations with impunity." But, contrary to Hume, they find this weakness deplorable, Harrison arguing that, given the relative amount of harm princes do, the indulgence allowed them is irrational. Harrison in fact at first agrees with Hume: "He is right, too, in suggesting that the obligations of nations to be just in their dealings with one another is [sic] of less force than the obligations of private persons." But after ten pages he has evidently changed his mind: "[with respect to] what Hume says about the comparative force of the morality of princes and the morality of private persons, though it is clear that there is nothing in principle wrong with Hume's view that the former has less force than the latter... it is doubtful whether he is right in saying that the former do in fact have less force than the latter." Like Cohen, who holds that "Injustice among nations should be regarded as being as reprehensible as injustice among individuals," Harrison concludes (more tentatively than Cohen) "my 113 own feeling... is that though Hume is right in thinking that the morality of princes is commonly regarded as being of less force than private morality, he is wrong... in thinking that... they [sic] are of less force." So none of our commentators agree with Hume that international morality not only is, but is properly, weaker than domestic. How did Hume go wrong? Hume argues that international morality is weaker because the interests at stake are less. Where the interests at stake do not matter very much, Hume thinks, it is not so important what people do, and thus the moral obligations involved are weaker. (Hume thinks this idea... (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the City is an outstanding reference source to this exciting subject and the first collection of its kind. Comprising 40 chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into clear sections addressing the following central topics: -/- • Historical Philosophical Engagements with Cities -/- • Modern and Contemporary Philosophical Theories of the City -/- • Urban Aesthetics -/- • Urban Politics -/- • Citizenship -/- • Urban Environments and the Creation/Destruction of (...) Place. -/- The concluding section, Urban Engagements, contains interviews with philosophers discussing their engagement with students and the wider public on issues and initiatives including experiential learning, civic and community engagement, disability rights and access, environmental degradation, professional diversity, social justice, and globalization. -/- Essential reading for students and researchers in environmental philosophy, aesthetics, and political philosophy, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the City is also a useful resource for those in related fields, such as geography, urban studies, sociology, and political science. (shrink)

Demonstrates that the "paradoxes of material implication" are only apparent, sticking entirely within the confines of classical logic.

The rapidly changing field of genetics affects society through advances in health-care and through implications of genetic research. This study addresses the impacts of new genetic discoveries and technologies on different segments of today's society. The book begins with a chapter on genetic complexity, and subsequent chapters discuss moral and ethical questions arising from today's genetics from the perspectives of health care professionals, the media, the general public, special interest groups and commercial interests.

Presents a /simple/ epistemic solution to the paradox of the surprise test, suitable for undergraduates. Given the Gazette's audience, recalcitrant versions, such as Sorenson's, would have been inappropriate to even mention. It is also classified under "logical paradoxes," because it can be argued that given the existence of logical, rather than epistemic, solutions, so also the paradox is logical, rather than epistemic. -/- The author was not sent proofs, because the /Gazette/ was then run on a "shoestring budget"; the 2009 (...) article is just as intended, and the journal is now typeset well. (shrink)

Previous studies of H. Richard Niebuhr's intellectual background have fallen into two groups: those that stress the German and especially Kantian sources of Niebuhr's thought, and those that emphasize the American and especially pragmatic sources of his thought.

In this volume, Joseph Catalano offers an in-depth exploration of Jean-Paul Sartre's four major philosophical writings: Being and Nothingness, Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, and The Family Idiot. These works have been immensely influential, but they are long and difficult and thus challenging for both students and scholars. Catalano here demonstrates the interrelation of these four works, their internal logic, and how they provide insights into important but overlooked aspects of Sartre's thought, such as (...) the body, childhood, and evil. The book begins with Sartre's final work, The Family Idiot, and systematically works backward to Being and Nothingness. Catalano then repeats the study by advancing chronologically, beginning with Being and Nothingness and ending with The Family Idiot and an afterword on Flaubert's Madame Bovary. Readers will appreciate Catalano's subtle readings as well as the new insights that he brings to Sartre's oeuvre. (shrink)

Gives a general method as well as some results (inspired by Asimov, 1951; since discovered to be in Bar-Hillel and Carnap [several versions; Charles Parsons referred me to /Language and Information/]) to recover meaning (eventually automatically) from logical form/logical probability, which are mirror images. (Sets are taken as extensions of predicates, and knowledge of the sizes is needed; to that extent the method is a posteriori).

We present a linear formalism which makes explicit and precise the confirming effect of independent multiple observers and repeated trials on composite ratings, taking as parameters quantitative estimates of the subjective inputs discussed. -/- Note that the subjective probability used here is so used to study the past not predict the future and is rather limited to what has been called in artificial intelligence "certainty factors," which are arbitrary, or, more well-known, the arbitrary values ascribed to predicates in fuzzy "logic." (...) This is clear because the scales themselves are arbitrary and of the radio-button type. (shrink)

A second demonstration (more powerful because more subtle) of how a prevalent scope error can render a model invalid, and thus how difficult modeling really is. The prevalence indicates the difficulty, as the error is often built-in and very subtle and thus easily escapes notice.

The full-text of the entire issue is available on the Web; readers seeing this should ensure that there is permission to download. It would be quite difficult to separate just my piece from the others.

Demonstrates the validity of the measure presented in "Estimating Semantic Content" on textbook examples using (binary) resolution [a generalization of disjunctive syllogism] theorem proving; the measure is based on logical probability and is the mirror image of logical form; it dates to Popper.

What must the United States do to remain the global superpower and stop alienating the rest of the world? The author of the bestselling "The Paradox of American Power" has one clear answer: soft power.

See the abstract for the "Abstracts from Logical Form II".

This is a review article of Tokuyasu Kakuta, Makoto Haraguchi, and Yoshiaki Okubo, "A Goal-Dependent Abstraction for Legal Reasoning by Analogy," /Artificial Intelligence and Law/ 5(March 1997): 97-118.

Replies to a letter by Dan Velleman re my my 1989 American Mathematical Monthly piece.

Examines the role of moral reasoning in America foreign policy. Discusses first the key question of whether foreign policy is a fit domain for ethical reasoning. Examines the difficulty in judging moral arguments and argues for a three-dimensional approach which weighs motives, means and consequences, rather than judgments based on motives or consequences alone. Co-published with the Aspen Institute.

This experimental study provides further support for a theory of meaning first put forward by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1953 and foreshadowed by Asimov in 1951. The theory is the Popperian notion that the meaningfulness of a proposition is its a priori falsity. We tested this theory in the first part of this paper by translating to logical form a long, tightly written, published text and computed the meaningfulness of each proposition using the a priori falsity measure. We then selected (...) the top propositions—by a priori falsity—and strung them together to form ad hoc abstracts and compared these abstracts with the published summary. The results were startling: translation to logical form, followed by application of the Asimovian idea and Bar-Hillel/Carnap mathematics as elaborated into an AI/NLP proposal in Fulda (1986, 1988), produced excellent abstracts, thereby providing a proof-of-concept that merely by knowing the logical form of long text passages, one can produce reasonable abstracts of them—without actually understanding the text. We here report on a second experiment analyzing, in the exact same manner, the correspondence that followed the published text of the first experiment. While the results of this confirming experiment are less startling, they nevertheless provide additional confidence in the promise of the technique. In other words, were the results of these two experiments to generalize, that would show that logical form captures much more semantics than has heretofore been considered likely. Far from (as is commonly supposed) being merely the syntactical rewrite of text into formal notation, translation to logical form, even when undertaken with almost no knowledge about the particular predicates, individual constants, or other objects referred to in that form, might capture the core of the meaning in some important sense. -/- Note: There is a key difference in the /style/ of the texts analyzed in I and II in this long paper, divided into two only for practical reasons—space; the first text analyzed is written in a tight mathematical style, while the second is written in the discursive style of philosophy. -/- Finally, the unusual (for me) length of this two-part paper is justified by its being data-driven. (shrink)

Solves what is sometimes, but not always, referred to as the third paradox of material implication. Readers downloading this piece should please also download the corrigendum. Note that "pragmatic" is here used in its original sense of context-sensitive, that is, adjacency. (This comment is made in response to an article in a student journal published in the western U.S. which claimed that I said that because something involves translation it must be pragmatic; that is so, in the original sense; only (...) grammaticality can ever be context-free; all meaning is context-sensitive, as "lawful" cannot meaningfully modify "whale."). (shrink)

Gives what we call "Asimov's Conjecture" that ambiguity can cause lying without lying, in that read one way a statement is tautologous, while read another way presents an iron-clad promise. Solves the conjecture on Asimov's own case by showing how the statement used (as diplomatic deception) is tautologous in propositional logic and an iron-clad promise in predicate logic (with a tense variable). The motivation for the experiment by Fulda & DeFontes (1989) and "Abstracts from Logical Form I/II (2006).".

The main purpose of this paper is to bring out some significant humanistic characteristics of Chinese religious thought. My account is limited to what is originally and typically Chinese. That is to say, it will exclude what has been influenced by Buddhism from India or Christianity from the Western world. Some of the theses of this paper are based on scholarly works, while others are drawn from the author's primary experience.

Alpha-beta pruning is a technique for pruning trees in artificial intelligence game-playing. This note draws an analogy between the technique, which is, in essence, an application of many-valued logic to the cut-off of the evaluation of conditionals in computer programs (for efficiency).

Considers the question of the authorship of the works in the title from a /philosophical/, as opposed to legal, standpoint, using the sense-reference dichotomy, intension-extension dichotomy, and procedural knowledge-declarative knowledge dichotomy. Reaches no conclusion.

Review article referring to my prior work in many contexts with the upshot that: Subject to an /extremely/ limited set of exceptions, /all/ sting operations are /per se/ gravely and deeply immoral for the simplest and plainest of reasons: They are calculated and deliberate attempts to bring out the worst in a fellow human being, to play to their weaknesses, and to pander to their blind spots. Whether performed by the government, the media, or other private organizations (for-profit or not-for-profit), (...) makes no ethical difference whatsoever, except one: When the government does it, everyone begins to think that such egregious behavior is just fine, although /it is anything but/. (shrink)

Extends the conception of "libertarianism" from the narrow politico-legal sphere to the ethical sphere, by adding two ethical principles which are the logical extension of the politico-legal principle, distinguishing between modesty and humility and providing a definition of the latter, relating the ethical principles to this understanding of humility, and giving two additional (libertarian) grounds for the acceptance of the ethical principles.

Discusses how the radio button and its technological cousins, graying out and "incompletely filled out" check-box forms "not accepted," and the like, compromise ethics in the context of professional autonomy of faculty in the matter of grading. Three case studies are given, based on my personal experience as a professor and instructor. -/- The point generalizes to all contexts, however, and can be read to object to all such radio-button forms, from multiple-choice tests for students, to surveys, etc.

Article interrelating /de facto/ bribery, public corruption, the disconnect between private life and public life, the disconnect between logic, on the one hand, and politics and ethics, on the other, and the four rationales for the exclusionary rules (in law), using New York City as a case study.